Difference between revisions of "User:Infinity Linden/OGP Trust Model UseCases"

From Second Life Wiki
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Initial list of cases to consider)
(few more cases)
Line 3: Line 3:
* User from one grid teleports to another, and her inventory comes along
* User from one grid teleports to another, and her inventory comes along
* User from one grid teleports to another, and her attachments come along
* User from one grid teleports to another, and her attachments come along
* User from one grid teleports to another, and rezzes an object from inventory there
* User from one grid teleports to another, and gives something from her inventory to another user there
* User from one grid teleports to another, and gives something from her inventory to another user there
* User from one grid teleports to another, and sells something from her inventory to another user there
* User from one grid teleports to another, and sells something from her inventory to another user there
* User from one grid teleports to another, and rezzes a vendor that another user than buys from
* User from one grid teleports to another, and rezzes a vendor that another user than buys from
Some threat-model cases:
* Attacker contacts RD1, attempts to masquerade as AD1
* Attacker contacts RD1, authenticates as an otherwise-unknown ADz (what should an unknown AD be able to do?)

Revision as of 10:57, 12 August 2008

We are gathering use-cases here, starting at the high "what the user actually does" level.

  • User from one grid teleports to another, and her inventory comes along
  • User from one grid teleports to another, and her attachments come along
  • User from one grid teleports to another, and rezzes an object from inventory there
  • User from one grid teleports to another, and gives something from her inventory to another user there
  • User from one grid teleports to another, and sells something from her inventory to another user there
  • User from one grid teleports to another, and rezzes a vendor that another user than buys from

Some threat-model cases:

  • Attacker contacts RD1, attempts to masquerade as AD1
  • Attacker contacts RD1, authenticates as an otherwise-unknown ADz (what should an unknown AD be able to do?)